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DEFINING LAW
TAL KASTNER*
I am in the impossible position of speaking at the end of a day’s worth ofwonderful presentations.  I am so honored to be a part of this rich con-
versation and I am so humbled by it.  Thank you, Chaim, and thank you to
Villanova and to our hosts and sponsors.  This is incredible work and a
wonderful opportunity to be a part of this symposium.
So, with that, I will echo earlier presenters and say that Chaim
Saiman’s book, Halakhah: The Rabbinic Idea of Law, offers a remarkably ac-
cessible and engaging account of the development of the framework of
Jewish law.  And in doing so, as the rich responses of this symposium have
demonstrated, it refracts the many forces that influence how we define the
rules. (I use “rules” in the capacious sense to include both rules and stan-
dards in the law because I think it will make more sense in the context of
my conversation.)
Chaim Saiman’s book makes salient the contingent interplay of his-
tory, narrative, ideals, culture, power, and texts in halakhah in a way that
sheds light on other expressions of law.  In reading it, I was struck by how
it prompts us to consider what we mean by “law.”  This has come up in
some of our conversations.  In focusing primarily on American texts, I
hope to show how the book gives us new purchase on our understanding
of American law and the way law is embedded in language and narrative.
Specifically, a set of federal district court decisions from the late 1990s
about the admissibility of evidence seized in a police stop serves as a useful
case study of the contingency of norms and of the embeddedness of legal
texts in the social world—which Chaim Saiman’s book illuminates.  This is
not to suggest a simple analogy between American case law and halakhah
but to demonstrate the dynamic of contingent norms, social context, his-
tory, and narrative that shapes the meaning of law.
The case I would like to look at is Bayless v. United States.1  This case
involves a couple of headline-making pre-trial decisions by Judge Harold
Baer in the Southern District of New York.  In Bayless, Judge Baer consid-
ered a motion to suppress evidence that was allegedly obtained in the ab-
sence of reasonable suspicion.2  The police had stopped “a middle-aged
* Jacobson Fellow in Law and Business, New York University School of Law.
1. Bayless v. United States (Bayless I), 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (order
granting motion to suppress); Bayless v. United States (Bayless II), 921 F. Supp. 211
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (order denying motion to suppress).  For a more involved discus-
sion of the way narrative informs the operation of law in this case, on which this
essay draws in part, see Tal Kastner, Policing Narrative, 71 SMU L. REV. 1117 (2018).
2. Bayless I, 913 F. Supp. at 234.
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black woman,” observed in Washington Heights, New York in the very
early morning hours as she was driving a rental car with Michigan license
plates.3  Among other things, the police found thirty-four kilograms of co-
caine and two kilograms of heroin in duffle bags in the car.4  Judge Baer’s
opinions, which I will return to in a few moments, demonstrate the in-
tertextuality of common law decisions and the boundary challenge of iso-
lating a rule (I mean “rule” in the capacious sense) in the rich text of what
we think of as “law.”
Halakhah: The Rabbinic Idea of Law5 points to the distinctive way that
halakhah manifests law.  As lived practices, a belief system, and deep tex-
tual engagement of the traditional Jewish canon, halakhah resists easy cat-
egorization, both as a genre and in terms of its social function.  But, as I
would like to argue, this distinctive operation of this manifestation of law
also derives from more universal dynamics.  It emerges from social, histori-
cal, and philosophical forces and is forged through lived practice and lan-
guage.  In that way, halakhah points us to a range of factors and influences
that, while they may be expressed in different and distinctive ways, make
up a more universal process of constituting “law.”  In other words, rather
than—or in addition to—categorizing halakhah as a strange case of law,
an encounter with halakhah invites us to consider the constitutive dimen-
sions of what we understand “law” to mean.
To be fair, as others have noted and Chaim Saiman’s book highlights
so beautifully, certain aspects of halakhah strike some as especially distinc-
tive.  The value of learning for learning sake, the investment in unresolved
outcomes, and rules that are recognized as unrealizable and yet still im-
portant, appear especially remarkable.
More familiarly in line with conventional structure of contemporary
American legal texts, canonical Jewish texts parse categories, distinctions,
and rules—though these rules might or might not be literally applicable
in the material world.  In the process, they purport to shape human expe-
rience.  Indeed, they have become embedded in social practices that
themselves apply and inform their meanings.
These texts also operate, as Halakhah points out, through a deeply
intertextual and allusive structure.  They invite the reader to explore the
valences of language.  Talmudic discussion, for example, interweaves ex-
pressive and normative dimensions to embrace a multiplicity of meaning.
The centrality of dialogue and debate, moreover, situates the texts in a
distinct rhetorical and social context.
Thus, for example, the Shulchan Aruch—to take one text in the ca-
non—comes to be seen both as an authoritative codification and, in
Chaim Saiman’s words, a devotional text.  And, by way of a synechdotal
example, its title demonstrates the range of dimensions through which
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. CHAIM N. SAIMAN, HALAKHAH: THE RABBINIC IDEA OF LAW (2018).
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halakhic legal authority is constructed.  Translated loosely as the “set ta-
ble,” this sixteenth-century “code” establishes its authority in part by way of
allusion.  It evokes commentary on the presentation of laws in Exodus in
which Moses is commanded to set out the reasoning of God’s laws like a
table set before the nation.  Through the engagement with precedent and
performance of authority (think Marbury) the Shulchan Aruch creates its
place in the canon.
Yet its name invites an even more expansive and multidimensional
conception of law.  A “set table” presents itself as a metaphor of human
existence and socialization, thereby conjuring the text’s comprehensive
sustenance.  It invokes the communal and dynamic facets along with ex-
plicit and implicit rules of fundamental human activity.  As sociologists
point out, much of our normative experience is determined by the way we
move through or inhabit our world.  The so-called “habitus,” or the mus-
cle memory and the things we all take for granted, directs our understand-
ing of the world and the norms we share.6  Through the metaphor of a
meal, the set table gestures toward the unstated components of law that
are baked into each community’s experience.
A two-word title thereby suggests the interplay among rule-positing
texts, practice, and inhabited norms in quotidian life.  And if we can treat
the Shulchan Aruch as indicative, we see that the collection of Jewish
texts—and the lived traditions that they invite and through which they are
understood—form a distinctive cultural artifact.
At the same time these dynamics—including the expressive/regula-
tory interplay—can been seen as part of a continuum that, while mani-
fested in different ways, influences the way that we understand law, even in
the (for some, more familiar) space of American life.
In contemporary American life, the formally codified rules of a stat-
ute inevitably fail to account for the operation of law.  The implementa-
tion of a written rule implicates all kinds of human and social dimensions,
such as prosecutorial discretion, institutional norms, and bureaucratic
processes, to name just a few.  Even within the text, the project of isolating
a rule is not necessarily simple.  As professors of law, we teach students to
differentiate between holding and dicta, and between the majority view
and dissenting opinions, for example.  But we know these distinctions are
not necessarily stable nor independent of social norms.  A litigator con-
structs and distills rather than finds rules, and line-drawing by courts is a
function of contingent experiences, context, and framing of fact.
This brings us back to the Bayless case that I mentioned at the outset.
At the first pretrial hearing in Bayless, Judge Baer granted a motion to
suppress the evidence.7  He held that the police lacked reasonable suspi-
cion to justify the stop.8  Judge Baer’s initial decision follows a familiar
6. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (Richard Nice, trans., 1980).
7. Bayless I, 913 F. Supp. at 234.
8. Id. at 243.
3
Kastner: Defining Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
696 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64: p. 693
mode of legal reasoning: questioning the purported significance of fact in
light of context and, at times, overarching principles of justice.  Rejecting
the state’s characterization of events, Judge Baer viewed the facts through
a different lens—a move familiar to any lawyer, and one that Halakhah
highlights in the Talmud.  Rather than accepting that a car with Michigan
plates ought to prompt suspicion in New York, Judge Baer identified its
presence as unremarkable, especially as he put it, in “a city that considers
itself ‘The Capital of the World.’”9  Similarly, Judge Baer rejected the
characterization of men seen approaching the car “single file” as suspi-
cious, and of their running off at the sight of the unmarked police car as
evasive conduct.10  Shifting the contextual frame, the decision asserts that,
in light of recent successful prosecution of police corruption “in this very
neighborhood,” “had the men not run when the cops began to stare at
them, it would have been unusual.”11
More unusually, perhaps, Judge Baer’s first pretrial decision seizes on
intertextuality to telegraph its philosophical perspective.  It begins with an
epigraph that quotes John F. Kennedy stating, “The great enemy of truth
is very often not the lie—deliberate, contrived, and dishonest—but the
myth—persistent, pervasive, and realistic.”12  The opinion thereby re-
minds us that the articulation and enactment of law is not only informed
by worldviews and at times aspirational ideals but also impacted by contin-
gent social forces.  In fact, Judge Baer’s first Bayless decision quickly be-
came a cultural flashpoint in what happened to be a year of tough-on-
crime campaigning.  The case prompted an outcry from the press (New
York Times editorial page included) and politicians—ranging from Re-
publican New York City Mayor Giuliani to Democratic President Bill Clin-
ton—with some even calling for Judge Baer’s impeachment.
Following this response, Judge Baer granted a motion for reconsider-
ation and reargument, which in turn opened the door for additional testi-
mony by the police about the transaction history on the particular corner
on which the car was spotted.  In addition to highlighting the way law is
embedded in social forces and distinct places and moments in time, the
second phase of this case illustrates the difficulty of delineating legal rules
in a rich text.
The second Bayless decision reflects Judge Baer’s concerted effort to
circumscribe the rules (and authority) of law.  But—reminiscent of, if not
analogous to, the challenge of defining Aggadah—this decision too dem-
onstrates the difficulty of isolating “law” in the richness of text.
In this second Bayless decision, Judge Baer reversed course and admit-
ted the evidence, explicitly abandoning what he called “the . . . dicta . . . in
9. Id. at 240.
10. Id. at 235, 240.
11. Id. at 242.
12. Id. at 234 (quoting President John F. Kennedy, Commencement Speech
at Yale University (June 11, 1962)).
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[his] initial decision.”13  In doing so, he acknowledged the porousness of
the distinction between reasonable suspicion and an unlawful stop in light
of the complexity of facts.  “The facts of this case,” he says, “have consist-
ently danced the fine line between a valid search and seizure . . . and a
trespass on citizens’ rights.”14  But, the expression of his disavowal per-
forms its ambivalence.  It demonstrates the impossibility of neatly ex-
tracting law from language or social existence.  Veering back to the macro
socio-legal problem that the case engages, Judge Baer asserted, “While it is
clear that the Fourth Amendment operates to protect all members of our
society from unreasonable searches and seizures, it is equally as unclear
whether this protection exists to its fullest extent for people of color gen-
erally, and in inner-city neighborhoods in particular.”15
Notwithstanding the pains Judge Baer took to define the holding as
“a proposition of law,” the decision continues to belie the simplicity of this
definition.16  Alluding to aspirational narratives and social critique, Judge
Baer concluded by quoting Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dissenting opin-
ion in the case of United States v. Sokolow17 rejecting stereotypes as a basis
for reasonable suspicion.  In what could be considered dicta, Judge Baer
reiterates Justice Marshall’s warning: “Because the strongest advocates of
Fourth Amendment rights are frequently criminals, it is easy to forget that
our interpretations . . . apply to the innocent and guilty alike.”18
Considered across time, the challenge of circumscribing the “law” in-
voked in this case becomes even more pronounced.  We can see the shift-
ing interplay of narratives, culture, ideals, power, and texts in light of
recent case law through which Judge Baer’s aspirational worldview mi-
grates from dicta to dissent to operative rules.
In the 2016 case Utah v. Strieff,19 Justice Sonia Sotomayor penned a
headline-grabbing dissent.  In Strieff, Sotomayor rejected the Supreme
Court’s holding that the discovery of a preexisting traffic warrant attenu-
ated the connection between an unlawful (admittedly suspicionless) po-
lice stop and the seizure of drugs.20  In light of the existence of a warrant,
discovered after the unlawful stop, the majority of the Court held evidence
of a drug crime admissible.21  Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion ech-
oes Martin Luther King Jr.’s now-canonical Letter from a Birmingham Jail to
give weight to the overlooked social costs of unlawfully obtained evidence.
13. Bayless v. United States (Bayless II), 921 F. Supp. 211, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(order denying motion to suppress).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
18. Bayless II, 921 F. Supp. at 217 (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 11 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
19. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
20. Id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
21. Id.
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She tells a story that positions the reader as an innocent defendant, and
not only cites literature—from the works of James Baldwin to Ta-Nehisi
Coates—but creates a space for the legitimacy of empathetic texts as a
basis for judgment.  In Strieff, Justice Sotomayor mobilizes King’s rhetori-
cal approaches and reframes the narrative to reject the majority’s cost/
benefit assessment of the exclusionary rule in this case.  Echoing King’s
demand for empathy through direct address, her dissenting opinion be-
gins by warning the reader: “Do not be soothed by the opinion’s technical
language: This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand
your identification, and check it for outstanding traffic warrants—even if
you are doing nothing wrong.”22  She warns, “By legitimizing the conduct
that produces this double consciousness, this case tells everyone, white
and black, guilty and innocent, that . . . your body is subject to invasion
while courts excuse the violation of your rights.”23
The opinion thereby embeds literary allusion and contingent social
experience into its definition of the costs that must be weighed in the
application of the exclusionary rule.  And, though expressed in dissent,
this vision ultimately emerges as a rule in other cases that begin to recog-
nize the experience of others.  For example, this same year, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court determined that the flight of black men from
the police must be considered in the context of racial profiling when as-
sessing reasonable suspicion24—thereby creating a diachronic link to
Judge Baer’s prescient framing of law.
I will wrap up by noting that this complex interaction of texts, norms,
rules, contingent contexts, formative narratives, and the application of the
force of law is not confined to our public space.  Indeed, in an area that is
closer to home for me, the distinctive American treatment of contracts—
especially the proliferation of contracts of adhesion in the form of con-
sumer contracts, nondisclosure agreements, and terms of use, for exam-
ple—can be seen as an outgrowth of a particular idea of contract in the
nineteenth century as a counterpoint to slavery.  Following Emancipation,
transactions between formerly enslaved people that replicated the con-
straints of slavery were deemed voluntary.  In this way, contract served as a
mark of freedom and shaped our understanding of what freedom means.
As a result of an American worldview of contract as a manifestation of
freedom, we have perhaps come to take for granted that our legal rights
do not presuppose a social safety net, education, or healthcare, as they do
in other parts of the world.  Similarly, our contract doctrine cannot be
unpacked from this worldview as we stand in contrast to other legal sys-
tems that recognize the asymmetrical power dynamic of certain form con-
tracts.  In a world of “seduction by contract,”25  American consumers are
22. Id. at 2065 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 2071 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
24. Massachusetts v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333 (Mass. 2016).
25. See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSY-
CHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012).
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given the so-called “choice” of not transacting or “agreeing” to ancillary
terms that threaten to deprive them of fundamental rights.  In other
words, contemporary American contract law is also hard to unpack from
the history, language, and culture that give it meaning.
Of course, history, text, social experience, culture, rules, and power
each operate differently in different contexts.  But, as Chaim Saiman’s lu-
cid book reminds us, we should not overlook the contingent and defining
dynamics of how they come to constitute “law.”
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